This expression does not mean that cash flow should be ignored, of course; rather, it refers to the sophisticated economic process of evaluating alternative capital investment projects, whereby cash flows associated with each project are forecast, in the manner just described, but probably quarterly rather than monthly, and the total net cash flow for each period calculated. The intention is not to raise finance, this is assumed to be available; rather, it is to decide which investment(s) to pursue. A rate of return sought by the company (the discount rate) is used to equate a future cash flow to a value in the present, and the overall effect gives a Net Present Value for each of the projects, with the highest receiving the funding. As an alternative, an Internal Rate of Return may be calculated which, as it were, smoothes out the cash flows to give rates which can be compared instead of values.
Financial theorists have developed detailed mechanisms for determining appropriate discount rates, the theory being that there are two elements that make up the risk associated with the project. One part is the risk that is inherent in being involved in the industry, the environment and the world surrounding the project, and this is called the systematic risk, to reflect which a suitable discount rate can be computed using independent data. The other element is the specific risk for the particular project, and this is deemed by the theory to have been fully investigated by the management team preparing the cash flow forecasts. In a theoretical, perfect world, all available information has been incorporated into the forecasts, all of which have been prepared under comparable sets of assumptions.
This has a validity if alternative projects are actually being compared, but it is often the case that individual investments are subjected to this process. As they say in the computer industry, garbage in, garbage out, so, if the forecast cash flows are garbage, sophisticated computation of a discount rate will make no material difference, and attention is being paid to the wrong end of the equation. The chances are that any major investment big enough to warrant discounted cash flow evaluation is going to have a significant impact on its marketplace, likely to change its nature. The effect of this cannot easily be forecast, because it will probably induce competitive reactions, the nature of which the competitors themselves cannot predict until the event occurs, unless they have a predetermined set of responses for every contingency. Using management consultants to ask competitors what they would do is not really helpful, because you cannot assemble the group of people who would actually take the decision – and, if you could, do you think they would tell you?
Comparing alternative investments under different sets of assumptions can be done, and if a particular one is consistently ahead, that should be the choice. Usually, two scenarios (an optimistic and a pessimistic) would be the limit, if only because of the work involved. The point really is that major projects are actually undertaken by big businesses as part of a strategic commitment, rather than on a purely economic evaluation. The forecasts are reviewed and revised until acceptable financial consequences are projected. (The parallel for the small trader is to revise the projections until the level of overdraft is acceptable to the bank manager.) The difference in the big business is that it takes more people to manipulate the cash flow forecasts. The wisdom they acquire in the process is not usually available for the people who end up running the subsequent project, who may find the reality something of a shock. On the other hand, as Eurotunnel has demonstrated, banks are unlikely to foreclose on multibillion pound projects.
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